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We study the evolutionary dynamics of the prisoner’s dilemma game in which cooperators and
defectors interact with another actor type called exiters. Rather than being exploited by defectors,
exiters exit the game in favour of a small payoff. We find that this simple extension of the game
allows cooperation to flourish in well-mixed populations that adhere to either direct or indirect
reciprocity. In combination with network reciprocity, however, the exit option is less conducive to
cooperation. Instead, it enables the coexistence of cooperators, defectors, and exiters through cyclic
dominance. Other outcomes are also possible as the exit payoff increases or the network structure
changes, including network-wide oscillations in actor abundances that may cause the extinction
of exiters and the domination of defectors, although game parameters should favour exiting. The
complex dynamics that emerges in the wake of a simple option to exit the game implies that nuances
matter even if our analyses are restricted to incentives for rational behaviour.
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In economic game theory, the conditions and conse-
quences of quitting a game [1], and voluntary participa-
tion in general, are fundamental topics [2]. In the the-
ory of the evolution of cooperation, however, they are
rarer guests [3, 4]. Because evolutionary game theory
traditionally concerns the competition between species,
it is not surprising that the primary focus is on involun-
tary interactions [5]. Nevertheless, there is an increasing
interest in modelling the interface between cooperation
and social behaviour in human populations. We will
also take this route and extend the canonical model of
cooperation between selfish individuals – the prisoner’s
dilemma [2, 6, 7] – with an option of exiting the game.
To more realistically incorporate sociality, our players, or
actors, will interact over model social networks [7–9].
There are historical examples where the option to exit
a game could have had a dramatic impact on the out-
come. In the final years of the 1950s, China carried out
far-reaching collectivisation of its society. Everyone in
the countryside had to belong to a ‘people’s commune’
where people shared everything – farming tools, seeding
crops, draft animals, kitchens, and health care. Even pri-
vate cooking was banned and replaced by communal can-
teens. Between 1958 and 1962, one of the worst famines
in the history of humanity struck the country [10]. Ever
since then, scholars have debated the connections be-
tween these social changes and the famine [11].
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One intriguing theory was proposed in 1990 by the
economist Justin Yifu Lin of Peking University [12]. He
pointed out that with the establishment of the people’s
communes, leaving a collective was no longer an option.
He reasoned that this revocation of the right to exit took
away a disincentive to free ride, as now farmers could no
longer avoid negative feedback loops of perfidy. Just how
important this mechanism was in the onset of famine has
been debated. For example, Refs. [13, 14] contend that
Lin was wrong using various economic arguments, while
Refs. [15, 16] lend support to the general idea of exit
options promoting cooperation.
We will not dwell further on the question of how well
Lin’s hypothesis explains the connection between the col-
lectivisation and famine. Instead, intrigued by this his-
torical example, we will investigate in a more generic
setting how much a simple right to exit can impact the
evolution of cooperation. Our starting point is the pris-
oner’s dilemma – a basic mathematical formulation of the
situation in which cooperation would be most beneficial
in the long run, but only considering the next interac-
tion, defection would be advantageous [2, 5, 7]. There
are many mechanisms promoting cooperation in the pris-
oner’s dilemma. Ref. [17] divides these mechanisms into
five categories – kin and group selection, as well as direct,
indirect, and network reciprocity. Others try to identify
common principles behind all these mechanisms [18, 19].
People interact in social networks [7]. The structure of
the networks can influence the game dynamics. There-
fore, many authors have investigated games in which ac-
tors interact over model networks [8, 9]. We will inves-
tigate the prisoner’s dilemma with an exit option on the
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2TABLE I. Payoff matrix for the weak prisoner’s dilemma
with an exit option.
C D E
C 1 0 0
D b 0 0
E   
The first row indicates that when a cooperator, C, meets
another cooperator, defector D or exiter E, she earns a payoff
equal to one, zero or zero, respectively. Analogously, when
a defector meets a cooperator, defector or exiter, she earn a
payoff equal to b ∈ (1, 2], zero or zero, respectively. Finally,
exiters earn a payoff equal to , 0 ≤  < 1, irrespective of
whom they meet.
regular lattice, as well as three additional types of net-
work models: (i) small-world networks that have many
triangles and short path-lengths characteristic of social
networks [20], (ii) random regular graphs known to be
very robust to perturbations, and (iii) scale-free networks
that have fat-tailed degree distributions characteristic of
socioeconomic systems [21].
In the extension of the prisoner’s dilemma game that
we consider, we assume that exiting is a third strategy
alongside cooperating and defecting. An exiter receives
a small reward for never playing the game again. We be-
gin our analysis with a well-mixed population where we
analyse both one-shot and iterated versions of the pris-
oner’s dilemma games with an exit option. After that,
we progressively add more network structural complexity
by considering populations in a lattice formation, as well
as homogeneous and heterogeneous networks.
RESULTS
Well-mixed populations. We start our analysis from
one of the simplest possible situations. Specifically, we
consider a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma with an exit op-
tion in a well-mixed population. We simplify the ex-
position without much loss of generality by assuming the
payoff structure of the weak prisoner’s dilemma (Table I)
[22]. Under these conditions, the existence of the exit op-
tion is in no way helpful in establishing cooperation; see
Supplementary Information (SI) Remark 1. Actors sim-
ply choose to exit the game even if the payoff obtained
by doing so is arbitrarily small; it is better to have some
return with certainty than to risk getting exploited by
defectors.
The situation changes when we replace the single-shot
game by an iterated game. Iterations, provided the game
proceeds sufficiently many rounds, may favour coopera-
tion; see SI Remark 2 and Ref. [6]. The exit option helps
to eliminate defection irrespective of how small the exit
payoff is. Without the fear of defection, actors ultimately
choose to cooperate because cooperation is more benefi-
cial than exiting the game. If we extend the game by
adding a variable representing actor reputation, the ef-
FIG. 1. Cooperation is sustained, but rarely dominant,
in networked populations with exit. We plot the full -
b phase diagram as obtained by Monte Carlo simulations of
the weak prisoner’s dilemma comprising an exit option in a
lattice. When the exit option is highly rewarding,  ' 0.52,
exiters dominate. A less rewarding exit option,  / 0.52, leads
to four different outcomes. If temptation is small, b / 1.04,
network reciprocity eo ipso ensures that cooperators remain
in the population indefinitely alongside defectors (the C+D
phase). Larger temptation values, b ' 1.04, lead to defector
domination for  ≤ 0 (the D phase), but otherwise sustain
the coexistence of all three actor types (the C+D+E phase)
or lead to cooperator domination (the C phase). Note that
purely cooperative outcomes emerge only over a small domain
of the -b phase plane.
fect is the same; see SI Remark 3. Our theory thus shows
that for well-mixed populations, the availability of the
exit option supports cooperation, but only accompanied
by another mechanism, e.g., direct or indirect reciprocity,
that makes cooperation a viable option in the first place.
These results open the question of what happens when
the exit option is available in conjunction with network
reciprocity.
Regular lattice. To answer the question of how co-
operation fares in networked populations with an exit
option, we resorted to numerical Monte Carlo simula-
tions; see Methods for details. We first performed simula-
tions in lattices characterised by the von Neumann neigh-
bourhood and the periodic boundary conditions. The
game parameters were the payoffs b, 1 < b ≤ 2, and ,
−0.1 <  < 1.
In Fig. 1, we show a phase diagram covering the full
range of parameter values. We can see that adding an
exit option can lead to complicated dynamics. First,
when the exit payoff is  ' 0.52, exiters outcompete other
actor types (the E phase in Fig. 1). Conversely, when
3FIG. 2. Time dependence of ac-
tor abundances reveals cyclic
dominance or sole game win-
ners. A, In the D phase, de-
fectors win by eliminating first ex-
iters, then cooperators. B, In the
C+D+E phase, oscillating actor
abundances are a signature of cyclic
dominance. C, In the C phase, the
rise of exiters drives defectors to ex-
tinction, while rare cooperators sur-
vive and later prosper. There is,
however, a narrow margin for this
to happen. D, In the E phase, the
rise of exiters wipes out cooperators
even before defectors. We show the
results for over 104 timesteps, which
was sufficient for actor abundances
to stabilise.
 / 0.52, there are four possible outcomes. Small temp-
tation b / 1.04 allows network reciprocity alone to secure
the coexistence of cooperators and defectors, while ex-
iters get eliminated from the population (the C+D phase
in Fig. 1). Larger temptation b ' 1.04 gives rise either to
(i) defector domination for  ≤ 0, (ii) the coexistence of
all three actor types, or (iii) cooperator domination (re-
spectively, the D phase, the C+D+E phase, and the C
phase in Fig. 1). A chief distinction between well-mixed
and networked populations emerging from these results
is that the latter permit dimorphic and trimorphic equi-
libria in which the different types of actors coexist. The
exit option thus seems unable to entirely displace defec-
tion in networked populations, which is in contrast to our
findings in well-mixed populations with either direct or
indirect reciprocity, as described above.
We can gain a better understanding of how the three
types of actors affect one another by looking at the
change of their abundances through time (Fig. 2). In
the D phase (Fig. 2A), exiters are the first to give way to
defectors, followed shortly thereafter by cooperators. In
the C+D+E phase (Fig. 2B), it is cooperators who start
giving way to defectors, but then – with less cooperators
around – exiters temporarily outnumber defectors. Fewer
defectors, in turn, allow cooperators to partly recover at
the expense of exiters. This proceeds until recovering co-
operators once more start giving way to defectors. We
have thus described a phenomenon called cyclic domi-
nance by which three actor types dominate one another
in an intransitive manner. In our case, cooperators dom-
inate exiters who dominate defectors who dominate co-
operators. Cyclic dominance has proven influential in
ecological [23] and evolutionary game-theoretic [24] con-
texts, especially in voluntary dilemmas and extensions
thereof [3, 25, 26].
The phenomenon of cyclic dominance disappears in the
C phase (Fig. 2C) because here, a substantial rise of ex-
iters drives defectors to extinction. At the same time, a
tiny fraction of cooperators survive and, in the absence
of defectors, eventually takes over the lattice. The rise
of exiters in the E phase (Fig. 2D), however, is so force-
ful that they wipe out cooperators even before defectors,
thus remaining the sole actor type in the lattice.
The relationships between actor types described here
could be seen as power relations. In Fig. 3, we fur-
ther analyse such relations by examining the equilibrium
abundances of cooperators, defectors, and exiters along
several transects of the phase space. These horizontal
transects reveal power relations between the three ac-
tor types depending on the temptation payoff, b. In the
usual weak prisoner’s dilemma without exit, this payoff
is equivalent to dilemma strength [27] and thus a cru-
cial determinant of the game outcome. Here, we find
that when exiting is neutral or costly ( ≤ 0), network
reciprocity can support cooperation by itself for small
values of temptation (b / 1.04), but generally, defec-
tors dominate (Fig. 3A). When, in contrast, exiting is
marginally to moderately profitable (0 <  / 0.52), net-
work reciprocity still supports cooperation for small val-
ues of temptation (b / 1.04), but otherwise the domi-
nation of defectors is replaced by the coexistence of all
three actor types (Fig. 3B).
The coexisting state is unusual in that the abundance
of exiters increases with temptation, first more at the ex-
4FIG. 3. Power relations be-
tween cooperators, defectors,
and exiters exhibit intricate
patterns. A, Along the horizon-
tal transect of the -b phase plane
at  = 0, network reciprocity alone
is enough to secure the coexistence
of cooperators and defectors for b /
1.04. Thereafter, defectors prevail.
B, Along the horizontal transect
at  = 0.46, cooperators, defec-
tors, and exiters coexist over the
temptation range 1.04 / b / 1.90
by way of cyclic dominance. For
b ' 1.90, cooperators dominate. C,
Along the vertical transect of the
-b phase plane at b = 1.02, net-
work reciprocity secures the coexis-
tence of cooperators and defectors
up to a relatively large exit payoff
of  ≈ 0.45. Between 0.45 /  /
0.50, all three actor types coexist,
whereas between 0.50 /  / 0.52,
there is a narrow strip of coopera-
tor dominance. Thereafter, exiters
prevail. D, Along the vertical tran-
sect at b = 1.4, defectors dominate
for  ≤ 0, the three actor types co-
exist for 0 <  / 0.49, coopera-
tors dominate over a narrow strip
between 0.49 /  / 0.52, and fi-
nally, exiters dominate thereafter.
Symbols (squares, circles, and tri-
angles) indicate the average steady-
state abundances of the three actor
types.
pense of defectors and later of cooperators. Temptation
thus fails to entice defection but instead pushes actors to
exit the game. This ultimately hurts defectors who can
even go extinct by temptation being too large (b ' 1.90)
and exiting sufficiently profitable (0.30 /  / 0.52).
Without defectors to exploit them, cooperators become
free to dominate (Fig. 3B).
In a similar vein as horizontal transects, vertical tran-
sects of the -b phase plane also reveal power relations be-
tween the three actor types, but this time depending on
the exit reward . For small temptation values, b / 1.04,
network reciprocity is enough to ensure the coexistence
of cooperators and defectors for a relatively wide range of
exit reward values (Fig. 3C). After crossing  ≈ 0.45, ex-
iters are able to reduce the abundance of defectors, and
after crossing  ≈ 0.50, defectors are eliminated, thus
allowing cooperators to flourish (Fig. 3C). Cooperator
domination, however, is short-lived because already be-
yond  ≈ 0.52, cooperators die out ahead of defectors,
so exiters ultimately prevail (Fig. 3C). For larger temp-
tation (1.04 / b / 1.90), the described situation partly
repeats, that is, for  ≈ 0.49 there is again a narrow
strip of cooperator domination, followed by a region of
exiter domination (Fig. 3D). The situation changes below
 ≈ 0.49 because network reciprocity is replaced by cyclic
dominance, which ensures the coexistence of all three ac-
tor types between 0 <  / 0.49. Defectors prevail if  ≤ 0
(Fig. 3D).
Cyclic dominance gives rise to non-trivial dependence
of actor abundances on the exit payoff. The average
steady-state abundance of exiters thus first goes up at
the expense of defectors from  ≈ 0.21, then goes down
in favour of cooperators from  ≈ 0.30, only to go up
one more time at the expense of defectors from  ≈ 0.44
(Fig. 3D). These undulations in exiter prevalence show
that whenever exiting suppresses defection, then coop-
5FIG. 4. Snapshots of evolutionary dynamics expose in detail the interactions between actor types. When the
exit payoff is negative (top row), both cooperators and defectors oust exiters, who get eliminated first. Afterwards, defectors
prevail. When the exit payoff is small-but-positive (second row), cyclic dominance ensues as recognisable by the eventual
patchy distribution of actor types. A larger positive exit payoff (third row) enables exiters to eliminate defectors, but in the
struggle between remaining cooperators and exiters, the former prevails. When the positive payoff is even larger (bottom row),
defectors and exiters ousts cooperators. Defectors ultimately lose to exiters who dominate alone. All simulations were run
with temptation b = 1.9 for 30,000 timesteps to generate the final snapshots (rightmost column). The intermediate snapshots
(second to fourth columns) were taken at different timesteps across rows to make the figure as illustrative as possible.
eration will soon increase. The margin for cooperator
domination is generally narrow and widens only for the
largest temptation that we consider 1.90 / b ≤ 2 (see the
C-phase in Fig. 1).
In contrast to the time-series in Fig. 2, which show
the aggregate development of actor abundances along the
temporal dimension, snapshots of evolutionary dynam-
ics provide insights into the development of local actor
abundances along both spatial and temporal dimensions
(Fig. 4). Snapshots thus open up the opportunity to
reexamine the described phenomena from a microscopic
perspective. Fixing temptation to b = 1.9, we learn that
non-positive exit payoffs make exiters weaker than coop-
erators or defectors (top row in Fig. 4). Consequently,
cooperators and defectors jointly eliminate exiters, af-
ter which cooperators succumb to defectors (top row in
Fig. 4). This sequence of events no longer transpires
when the exit payoff turns positive. Then, instead, all
three actor types get perpetually stuck in a loop of cyclic
dominance (second row in Fig. 4). Making the exit pay-
off even more positive allows small pockets of coopera-
tors to survive until the elimination of defectors by ex-
iters. Afterwards, cooperators dominate exiters (third
row in Fig. 4). Finally, if the exit payoff becomes too
large, then even cooperators cannot stand up to exiters.
Pressured from both defectors and exiters, cooperators
get eliminated first, while defectors experience the same
fate shortly thereafter, leaving exiters to dominate alone
(bottom row in Fig. 4).
The above analysis of evolutionary snapshots demon-
6FIG. 5. Network structure is an important determinant of evolutionary dynamics in the studied game. A,
Regular small-world networks have a smaller diameter, but otherwise remain similar to the regular lattice from which they were
constructed. Consequently, the results here resemble those in Fig. 3C, D for both small temptation (b = 1.02) in the upper
panel and larger temptation (b = 1.4) in the lower panel. B, Random regular networks differ more extensively from the regular
lattice than regular small-world networks. This affects evolutionary dynamics. For example, there is no cyclic dominance in
the upper panel when temptation is small (b = 1.02). Cyclic dominance is seen again in the lower panel when temptation
is larger (b = 1.4), but here the rise of exiters can trigger defector domination for exit payoffs between 0.30 /  / 0.35. C,
Scale-free networks, constructed using the Baraba´si-Albert algorithm [28], give rise to fundamentally different evolutionary
dynamics compared to other network structures. These networks support a large cooperator abundance even at temptation
b = 2, as seen in the upper panel. Some level of cooperation is possible even at temptation b = 4, as seen in the lower panel.
The coexistence of all three actor types, which arises at relatively large values of the exit payoff, is supported by a mechanism
different from cyclic dominance. Finally, the sole domination of exiters is seen only at the near-maximum values of the exit
payoff. Symbols (squares, circles, and triangles) indicate the average steady-state abundances of the three actor types.
strates that network reciprocity combines with the exit
option differently than direct and indirect reciprocity. In
combination with the latter two reciprocities, an arbitrar-
ily small-but-positive exit payoff can undermine defection
(SI Fig. S1). In contrast, in combination with network
reciprocity, cooperation can only happen via the coex-
istence of all three actor types due to cyclic dominance.
How general are these observations? To answer this ques-
tion, we proceed to examine whether and how the under-
lying network structure affects evolutionary dynamics.
Other networks. To understand the effects of network
structure on evolutionary dynamics, we ran simulations
along the vertical transects of the -b phase plane in three
additional network types: regular small-world, random
regular, and scale-free (Fig. 5). The results of these sim-
ulations are thus analogous – and best understood by
comparing – to the results in Fig. 3C, D. In constructing
regular small-world networks, we started with the regular
lattice and used random rewiring with the probability of
3 % to disconnect two neighbouring nodes and connect
two nodes that had been distant before. This construc-
tion reduced the network diameter but left other prop-
erties, e.g., the density of squares, almost unchanged,
which is why the simulation results for this network type
7FIG. 6. Nature of coopera-
tor, defector, and exiter coex-
istence changes with network
structure. A, In the regular
lattice, initial large oscillations in
average actor abundances quickly
dampen and give way to much
smaller oscillations that are a sig-
nature of cyclic dominance. B,
Regular small-world networks have
a smaller diameter than the regu-
lar lattice, but a similar density of
squares, which somewhat increases
the amplitude of oscillations. C,
Random regular networks have not
only a smaller diameter than the
regular lattice, but also a much
smaller density of squares. This is
sufficient to trigger global-scale os-
cillations that may be large enough
to eliminate exiters in some in-
stances. D, In scale-free networks,
hub nodes are predominantly co-
operative, while small-degree nodes
switch between defection and exit-
ing. Temptation is b = 1.4 and the
exit payoff is  = 0.3, except in the
scale-free network where b = 4 and
 = 0.5.
and the regular lattice are similar (Fig. 5A). The only
noteworthy difference is that for small temptation values
(b = 1.02), regular small-world networks support cyclic
dominance more easily than the lattice (upper panel in
Fig. 5A). For larger temptation values (b = 1.4), we ob-
serve the same evolutionary dynamics in both network
types (lower panel in Fig. 5A).
In constructing random regular networks, we followed
the same procedure as for regular small-world networks,
but with the rewiring probability as large as possible.
This reduced not only the network diameter, but also the
density of squares [29], causing evolutionary dynamics to
change in two important ways (Fig. 5B). For small temp-
tation (b = 1.02), cyclic dominance vanishes (upper panel
in Fig. 5B), whereas for larger temptation (b = 1.4), there
is a region of cyclic dominance as before, but now this
region is separated from the narrow strip of cooperator
domination by a strip of defector domination (lower panel
in Fig. 5B). How it is possible that defectors become dom-
inant when the values of the exit payoff already strongly
favour exiters? We will resolve this mystery shortly, after
looking at the evolutionary dynamics in scale-free net-
works.
Scale-free networks, constructed using the Baraba´si-
Albert model [28], lead to evolutionary dynamics that
are fundamentally different than in other network types
(Fig. 5C). Even if temptation is ramped up to b = 2, net-
work reciprocity supports a large cooperator abundance
up to the exit payoff of  ≈ 0.48 (upper panel in Fig. 5C).
After that, the abundance of exiters increases linearly
with the exit payoff up to  ≈ 0.91, when this actor type
finally prevails. A similar picture holds even for temp-
tation b = 4, except that the abundances of cooperators
and defectors switch places (lower panel in Fig. 5C).
It is illustrative at this point to look at the time-series
of cooperator, defector, and exiter abundances when all
three actor types coexist (Fig. 6). In the regular lat-
tice, we find that initial large oscillations subside rather
quickly, after which there are only small oscillations
around the average abundances that are characteristic
of cyclic dominance (Fig. 6A). The situation is similar
in regular small-world networks, although the amplitude
of oscillations around the average abundances is larger
than before (Fig. 6B). The similarity between the time-
series in these two cases seems to arise from almost the
same density of squares in regular small-world networks
as in the regular lattice. It would appear that squares
keep oscillations local, and thereby small in amplitude
(SI Fig. S2A). This is perhaps expected for the regular
lattice that lacks long-distance links, but less so for reg-
ular small-world networks that are much more compact.
Consistent with the above ideas, we further observe
that as the density of squares approaches zero in ran-
dom regular networks, oscillations become network-wide
and develop very large amplitudes (Fig. 6C; see also
SI Fig. S2). There are even instances in which ampli-
tudes are large enough to exterminate exiters, which is
the reason why defector domination appears in the lower
8panel of Fig. 5B when the exit payoff should strongly
support exiters. We also find that the nature of ac-
tor coexistence in scale-free networks is entirely differ-
ent compared to other network structures. Hub nodes
tend to cooperate, while small-degree nodes tend to
switch between defection and exiting, which ultimately
creates noisy rather than oscillating time-series of actor
abundances (Fig. 6D). We visualise the described coexis-
tence patterns by animated movies that are available at
doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/GRHSB.
DISCUSSION
We have shown that adding an exceedingly simple exit
option to a weak variant of the prisoner’s dilemma is
enough to generate complicated dynamics. In particular,
we have seen that in well-mixed populations, an arbitrar-
ily small-but-positive exit payoff,  > 0, is sufficient to
destabilise defection; see SI Remark 1. If there is also
a viable reciprocity mechanism, cooperators can invade
the population as long as their initial fraction is above 
(SI Fig. S1B).
Combining the exit option with network reciprocity
produces outcomes that differ greatly from those in well-
mixed populations [5]. Here, an arbitrarily small-but-
positive exit payoff typically leads to the coexistence of
cooperators, defectors, and exiters through cyclic domi-
nance. Yet other outcomes are possible as the exit payoff
increases or as the underlying network structure changes.
It is particularly interesting that square-dense network
structures, like the regular lattice, keep cyclic dominance
local. In contrast, networks without squares, such as
random regular networks, turn cyclic dominance into a
global phenomenon. Dramatic oscillations may ensue (SI
Fig. S2), giving rise to sudden extinction of exiters and
subsequent unexpected domination of defectors.
Parallels between our exiters and well-known loners,
which rose to prominence as a mechanism behind cyclic
dominance [3, 25, 26], undoubtedly invite comparisons
between the two. In this sense, the fact that exiters
are just as responsible for cyclic dominance in networked
populations as are loners shows that non-zero payoffs
received by cooperators and defectors when interacting
with loners are practically irrelevant for the observed dy-
namic phenomena. The exit option can thus be deemed,
if not more basic, than at least more economical than the
loner option. Exiters, furthermore, leave both coopera-
tors and defectors completely hanging when they walk
away from the game, which seems to correspond to vari-
ous real-world situations. To exemplify, if completion of
a scientific project rests on collaboration, two genuinely
cooperative researchers should be able to complete the
project as planned. If one of the researchers has free-
riding tendencies, the project may still get completed,
but the invested effort will be asymmetric. If, however,
one researcher outright abandons the project for another
project with a smaller-but-immediate payoff, the remain-
ing researcher is left with little hope for success.
The view that exit option is beneficial for cooperation
is being challenged by a new psychological study [30]. If
the exit payoff is too large, our model supports this ob-
servation. The authors of Ref. [30] proceed to conclude
that “both research and practice can gain greatly in rich-
ness by giving more consideration to exit options in the
study of cooperation”, which is – given the richness of
our results – a sentiment that we wholeheartedly agree
with.
Returning to the example of the Chinese famine, our
results agree with Ref. [12] in that having an exit op-
tion could save cooperation in the system. It is hard to
interpret more of our results in that context; in conform-
ing the model to networked evolutionary games, we lost
the connection to that motivational example. Instead, we
discovered that a seemingly minute adjustment to include
exiters, leads to a plethora of dynamic phenomena. This
shows that nuances matter even if we restrict ourselves
to the goal of economic and evolutionary game theory,
that is, to elucidate incentives for rational behaviours.
If we wanted to raise the bar and proceed to modelling
general human behaviour [19, 31], details of the model
would be even more important.
METHODS
The key elements of our modelling approach comprised
(i) actions and payoffs, (ii) population structure, (iii) ac-
tion selection, and (iv) simulation settings. We proceed
to briefly describe each of these elements.
Actions and payoffs. For the sake of simplicity, we
chose to base our model on the weak prisoner’s dilemma.
In this game, cooperators encountering cooperators re-
ceive the payoff equal to unity. Cooperators encoun-
tering defectors receive nothing. Conversely, defectors
encountering cooperators receive the temptation payoff
b > 1. Defectors encountering defectors receive nothing.
We added a third action to this setup, dubbed exit, such
that exiters typically receive a small-but-positive payoff
 > 0 irrespective of whom they encounter. Coopera-
tors and defectors encountering exiters receive nothing.
Additional limits imposed on the payoffs were b ≤ 2 and
 < 1 in order to (i) make the cumulative value of mutual
cooperation greater or equal to that of defection and (ii)
make exiting less valuable than cooperating, respectively.
The described setup is neatly summarised in Table I.
Population structure. We assumed two general types
of populations, well-mixed and networked. In the for-
mer case, an actor can encounter any other actor. In the
latter case, an actor encounters only their neighbours as
prescribed by the network. The basic network structure
used in simulations was the regular lattice in two dimen-
sions with the von Neumann neighbourhood. We also
generated regular small-world networks and random reg-
ular networks by rewiring the underlying lattice, where
the probability of rewiring any particular link ranged
9from 1 % (small-world) to 99 % (random). To generate
scale-free networks for simulation purposes, we used the
Baraba´si-Albert algorithm [28].
Action selection. In well-mixed populations, action
selection followed the usual replicator dynamics. Actors
in networked populations selected their actions through
imitation. Specifically, denoting the payoff earned by a
focal actor i with Πi and the payoff of a randomly se-
lected neighbour j with Πj , the probability of the actor
i imitating the neighbour j was given by the Fermi rule:
Wi←j =
1
1 + exp
(
Πj−Πi
K
) , (1)
where K measures the irrationality of selection. Note
that as K → 0, the Fermi rule turns into the Heavi-
side step-function such that Wi←j = 0 if Πi < Πj , and
Wi←j = 1 if Πi > Πj , while Wi←j = 0.5 if Πi = Πj holds
by definition. We set K = 0.1 throughout the study.
Simulation settings. We arranged simulations in a se-
ries of Monte Carlo timesteps. In each timestep, we ran-
domly selected a focal actor who then played the game
with all their neighbours. We thereafter randomly se-
lected one of the focal actor’s neighbours, and allowed
this neighbour to play the game with all their neighbours
as well. We finally compared the payoffs of the focal ac-
tor and the selected neighbour to determine whether the
focal actor imitates the neighbour or not.
We paid special attention in simulations to ensure that
(i) transient dynamics had subsided and that (ii) finite-
size effects had been eliminated. We thus ran simula-
tion for O (104) timesteps, typically 50,000, while aver-
aging actor abundances over the last O (103) timesteps,
typically 5,000. Networks used in the study contained
O (103) nodes, typically 5,000.
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A1
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION FOR
“EXIT RIGHTS OPEN COMPLEX PATHWAYS TO COOPERATION”
Remark 1. We analyse, by means of the replicator equations, the evolutionary dynamics of a one-shot prisoner’s
dilemma with exit in a well-mixed population. Let x, y, and z respectively denote the densities of cooperators (C),
defectors (D), and exiters (E) in the population, where 0 ≤ x, y, z ≤ 1 and x + y + z = 1. The replicator equations
are:
x˙ = x
(
ΠC −Π
)
,
y˙ = y
(
ΠD −Π
)
,
z˙ = z
(
ΠE −Π
)
.
(S1)
The symbols ΠC , ΠD, and ΠE denote, in that order, the expected payoff from cooperating, defecting, and exiting,
whereas Π = xΠC + yΠD + zΠE is the expected per-capita payoff of the whole population. Based on the payoffs
defined in Table I of the main text:
ΠC = x,
ΠD = bx,
ΠE = .
(S2)
Using the constraint z = 1− x− y, we obtain:
x˙ = f (x, y) = x [(1− x) (ΠC −ΠE)− y (ΠD −ΠE)] = x [(1− x) (x− )− y (bx− )] ,
y˙ = g (x, y) = y [(1− y) (ΠD −ΠE)− x (ΠC −ΠE)] = y [(1− y) (bx− )− x (x− )] , (S3)
This system of equations has four equilibrium points: (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1), and (, 0, 1− ). To examine the
stability of these equilibria, we calculate the Jacobian matrix:
J =
[
∂f(x,y)
∂x
∂f(x,y)
∂y
∂g(x,y)
∂x
∂g(x,y)
∂y
]
, (S4)
where
∂f(x,y)
∂x = x (2− 3x− 2by) + (−1 + 2x+ y) ,
∂f(x,y)
∂y = x (−bx+ ) ,
∂g(x,y)
∂x = y (b− 2x− by + ) ,
∂g(x,y)
∂y = x (b− x− 2by) + (−1 + x+ 2y) ,
(S5)
and then look at the determinant and the trace of matrix J . The results of the stability analysis are:
• For point (1, 0, 0), we obtain det J = (−1 + b) (−1 + ) < 0, indicating that the equilibrium is unstable.
• For point (0, 1, 0), we obtain det J = 0 and tr J =  ≥ 0, again indicating that the equilibrium is unstable for
any 0 <  < 1.
• For point (0, 0, 1), we obtain det J = 2 ≥ 0 and tr J = −2 ≤ 0, indicating that the equilibrium is stable for
any 0 <  < 1.
• Finally, for point (, 0, 1− ), we obtain det J = 2 (−1 + b) (1− ) ≥ 0 and tr J = (b− )  ≥ 0, indicating one
more time that the equilibrium is unstable.
In summary, all actors exit the game provided that for doing so they receive an arbitrarily small payoff.
Remark 2. We extend our previous analysis of the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma with exit in a well-mixed population
to a situation when the game is iterated. Iterations mean that two actors play the game for an unspecified number
of rounds determined by a termination probability q. Precisely, the game may be terminated after each round with
probability q, or it may continue with probability 1 − q. We furthermore assume that cooperative actors in the
iterated game cooperate conditionally, that is, resort to the tit-for-tat strategy, because it is a well-known result of
evolutionary game theory that unconditional cooperation is easily undermined by defection [1]. Cooperative actors
thus start the game with cooperation, and proceed in the same fashion unless they are paired with a defector, in which
case defection in the previous round is met with defection by the cooperative actor in the current round. Under such
circumstances, the payoff matrix transforms into:  1q 0 0b 0 0

q

q

q
 . (S6)
A2
Based on this matrix, the expected payoffs from cooperating, defecting, and exiting become:
ΠC =
x
q ,
ΠD = bx,
ΠE =

q .
(S7)
Consequently, for the functions f (x, y) and g (x, y) as defined in Eq. (S3), we get:
f (x, y) = x
[
(1− x) x−q − y
(
bx− q
)]
,
g (x, y) = y
[
(1− y)
(
bx− q
)
− xx−q
]
.
(S8)
The iterated game has the same four equilibrium points as the single-shot game: (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1), and
(, 0, 1− ). To examine the stability of these equilibria, we calculate the elements of the Jacobian matrix (Eq. S4):
∂f(x,y)
∂x =
x
q (2− 3x− 2bqy) + (−1 + 2x+ y) q ,
∂f(x,y)
∂y = x
(
−bx+ q
)
,
∂g(x,y)
∂x =
y
q (bq − 2x− bqy + ) ,
∂g(x,y)
∂y =
x
q (bq − x− 2bqy) + (−1 + x+ 2y) q ,
(S9)
and then look at the determinant and the trace of matrix J . The results of the stability analysis are:
• For point (1, 0, 0), we obtain det J = 1q2 (−1 + bq) (−1 + ) and tr J = 1q (−2 + bq + ). The determinant is
positive, while the trace is negative if q < 1b . A sufficiently low termination probability, therefore, makes
the fully cooperative equilibrium stable.
• For point (0, 1, 0), we obtain detJ = 0 and tr J = q ≥ 0. Accordingly, irrespective of the termination probability,
the fully defecting equilibrium is unstable when there is an arbitrarily small exit payoff.
• For point (0, 0, 1), we obtain det J = 2q2 ≥ 0 and tr J = − 2q ≤ 0. This indicates that the fully exiting equilibrium
is stable provided there is an arbitrarily small payoff associated with the exit option.
• For point (, 0, 1− ), we obtain det J = 2q2 (−1 + bq) (1− ) and trJ =
(
b− q
)
. The determinant here can
be positive if q > 1b , but in that case the trace is also positive, indicating that the mixed cooperative-exiting
equilibrium is unstable.
In summary, iterations may overcome the dilemma in favour of cooperation if the termination probability is sufficiently
low. The exit option meanwhile eliminates defection regardless of how small the exit payoff is (Fig. S1). In the mix
of cooperators and exiters, the smaller the values of q and , the more likely it is for cooperation to prevail.
Remark 3. The success of iterations in promoting cooperation is due to a mechanism called direct reciprocity that
manifests in the tit-for-tat strategy of conditional cooperators [2]. The gist of direct reciprocity is that cooperative
actors have the time to assess whether they are paired with cooperators and then act accordingly. This naturally
leads to a question if there could be other, more indirect, ways to assess whether someone is a cooperator. It turns out
that reputation precisely serves this purpose, leading to the evolution of cooperation through indirect reciprocity [3].
Assuming that an actor’s reputation is known with a probability p, the payoff matrix of a single-shot game transforms
into:  1 0 0(1− p) b 0 0
  
 . (S10)
The expected payoffs from cooperating, defecting, and exiting then become:
ΠC = x,
ΠD = (1− p) bx,
ΠE = ,
(S11)
while the functions f (x, y) and g (x, y) as defined in Eq. (S3) turn into:
f (x, y) = x [(1− x) (x− )− y ((1− p) bx− )] ,
g (x, y) = y [(1− y) ((1− p) bx− )− x (x− )] . (S12)
The single-shot game with indirect reciprocity has the same four equilibrium points as before: (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0),
(0, 0, 1), and (, 0, 1− ). To examine the stability of these equilibria, we calculate the elements of the Jacobian
A3
matrix (Eq. S4):
∂f(x,y)
∂x = −3x2 − (1− y) + 2x [1− b (1− p) y + ] ,
∂f(x,y)
∂y = x [−b (1− p)x+ ] ,
∂g(x,y)
∂x = y [−2x+ b (1− p) (1− y) + ] ,
∂g(x,y)
∂y = −x2 + b (1− p)x (1− 2y) + (−1 + x+ 2y) ,
(S13)
and then look at the determinant and the trace of matrix J . The results of the stability analysis are:
• For point (1, 0, 0), we obtain det J = [1− b (1− p)] (1− ) and tr J = −2 + b (1− p) + . The determinant is
positive, while the trace is negative if p > b−1b . A sufficiently high probability of knowing the other actor’s
reputation thus makes the fully cooperative equilibrium stable.
• For point (0, 1, 0), we obtain detJ = 0 and tr J =  ≥ 0. Accordingly, irrespective of the probability of knowing
the other actor’s reputation, the fully defecting equilibrium is unstable when there is an arbitrarily small exit
payoff.
• For point (0, 0, 1), we obtain det J = 2 ≥ 0 and tr J = −2 ≤ 0. This indicates that the fully exiting equilibrium
is stable provided there is an arbitrarily small payoff associated with the exit option.
• For point (, 0, 1− ), we obtain detJ = 2 [−1 + b (1− p)] (1− ) and trJ = [b (1− p)− ] . The determinant
here can be positive if p > b−1b , but in that case the trace is also positive, indicating that the mixed cooperative-
exiting equilibrium is unstable.
In summary, indirect reciprocity may overcome the dilemma in favour of cooperation if the probability of knowing the
other actor’s reputation is sufficiently high. The exit option meanwhile eliminates defection regardless of how small
the exit payoff is (Fig. S1). In the mix of cooperators and exiters, the larger the value of p and the smaller the value
, the more likely it is for cooperation to prevail.
A4
SUPPLEMENTARY FIGURES
FIG. S1. Exiting destabilises defection, while reciprocity ensures cooperation. In well-mixed populations with direct
or indirect reciprocity, there are three monomorphic evolutionary equilibria (cooperation, defection, and exiting respectively
denoted C, D, and E) and one dimorphic equilibrium (cooperation-exiting). Any positive exit payoff,  > 0, destabilises
the D equilibrium. In contrast, whether the C equilibrium is stable or not depends on the strength of reciprocity, that is,
the game termination probability under direct reciprocity or the probability of knowing the other actor’s reputation under
indirect reciprocity. A, The panel shows a ternary plot of evolutionary dynamics under indirect reciprocity when the exit
payoff is  = 0.2. The C and E monomorphic equilibria are stable (black disks), whereas the two other equilibria are unstable
(white disks). Because of the relatively large exit payoff, evolutionary dynamics converge to the E equilibrium when the initial
abundance of cooperators is small. Otherwise, cooperation evolves. B, In the limit of an infinitesimally small exit payoff (here,
 = 0.01), the monomorphic E equilibrium and the dimorphic equilibrium coincide. Cooperation evolves irrespective of how
small the initial cooperator abundance is. In both ternary plots, the probability of knowing the other actor’s reputation is
p = 0.75, whereas temptation is b = 1.2. Analogous ternary plots can be obtained under direct reciprocity too.
A5
FIG. S2. How local cyclic dominance turns into global oscillations of actor abundances. A, The panel displays the
variance of actor abundances (estimated over the last 5,000 simulation timesteps) as the functions of the density of squares,
where this latter quantity was calculated following the definition in Ref. [4]. Larger variances reflect larger oscillation amplitudes
around equilibrium actor abundances. The density of squares decreases from the regular lattice to random regular networks by
increasing the link rewiring probability from zero to unity. Here, temptation is b = 1.4 and the exit payoff is  = 0.3. B–G, In
random regular networks (constructed from the regular lattice with the rewiring probability of 0.99), the oscillation amplitude
of actor abundances is large for certain sets of parameter values. Here, temptation is b = 1.4, while the exit payoff progressively
increases from  = 0.25 to  = 0.30 in steps of 0.01. The exiter abundance oscillates with the largest amplitude which is why
this actor type goes extinct when the exit payoff is between 0.30 /  / 0.35.
A6
[1] M. A. Nowak, K. Sigmund, The dynamics of indirect reciprocity, J. Theor. Biol. 194 (4) (1998) 561–574.
[2] C. Taylor, M. A. Nowak, Transforming the dilemma, Evolution 61 (10) (2007) 2281–2292.
[3] M. A. Nowak, K. Sigmund, Evolution of indirect reciprocity, Nature 437 (7063) (2005) 1291–1298.
[4] P. Holme, C. R. Edling, F. Liljeros, Structure and time evolution of an Internet dating community, Soc. Netw. 26 (2) (2004)
155–174.
